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Article

Anthony Amsterdam’s Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, and What It Teaches
About the Good and Bad in Rodriguez v.
United States
Tracey Maclin

†

INTRODUCTION
Anthony Amsterdam’s article, Perspectives on the Fourth
1
Amendment is one of the best, if not the best, law review article written on the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Minnesota Law
Review on its hundredth anniversary fittingly recognizes and
honors Professor Amsterdam’s article in its Symposium edition,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Celebrating 100 Volumes
2
of the Minnesota Law Review. I am flattered that the Law Review invited me to participate in this Symposium.
Like his mentor and former boss, Justice Felix Frankfurter, Anthony Amsterdam is a self-described “fourth amendment
3
buff.” Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment is probably the
† Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Wayne
LaFave and Lauryn Gouldin for their comments and insights after reading a
draft of this Article. Also, thanks to Kaileigh Callender and Chris Daley for
their assistance in the preparation of this Article. Copyright © 2016 by Tracey
Maclin.
1. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
2. 100 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1729–2166 (2016).
3. Amsterdam, supra note 1. Justice Frankfurter’s devotion to the
Fourth Amendment was legendary. According to one scholar, “Frankfurter always considered himself something of an expert on the Fourth Amendment.”
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 157 (1991). In 1947, Justice Frankfurter told his colleagues
that he was obsessed with the Fourth Amendment: “I am nuts about it because there is [no] provision of the Constitution more important to be nuts
about . . . . [There is n]othing more important in [the] Bill of [R]ights than
search and seizure.” Frank Murphy, Conference Notes on Harris v. United
States (1947) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Frank Murphy Papers, Reel 135). Ten years later, in a letter to Chief Justice
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most famous of Professor Amsterdam’s contributions to the development of American constitutional criminal procedure. But
Professor Amsterdam has been involved with (and influenced)
many of the Supreme Court’s landmark criminal procedure and
4
constitutional law cases. For example, Professor Amsterdam’s
Earl Warren, Frankfurter confessed his devotion to the Fourth Amendment
when he wrote: “To the extent that I am charged, not by you, with being ‘a nut’
on the subject of the ‘knock at the door,’ I am ready to plead guilty.” Letter
from Justice Frankfurter to Chief Justice Warren 3 (Apr. 19, 1957) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Felix Frankfurter Papers,
Box 92).
4. Professor Anthony Amsterdam co-authored the briefs in and argued
the three most important death penalty cases of the 1970s. See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (ruling that Georgia’s new death penalty law,
which provided for bifurcated proceedings (a “guilt-determination phase” and
a “sentencing phase”) and guided the discretion of the sentencing jury during
the sentencing-phase proceeding, was constitutional; Professor Amsterdam coauthored the petitioner’s brief and argued on behalf of Gregg); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (ruling that, as applied in Georgia, the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment; Professor Amsterdam co-authored the petitioner’s brief and argued
on behalf of Furman). Professor Amsterdam was also the co-author of the
briefs in Gregg’s companion cases: Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Finally, Professor Amsterdam co-authored the petitioner’s brief and argued Lockett v. Ohio, in which a
plurality concluded that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer [in a death penalty case] not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.” 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (footnotes
omitted).
Professor Amsterdam’s article, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960), has been cited by the Supreme
Court in seventeen cases: Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 970 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 n.14 (1982); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 290 n.12 (1982); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445
U.S. 308, 315 n.12 (1980); Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982, 986 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.7 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
775 n.5 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 91–92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 n.8 (1972); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 685 n.11 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 257 (1967);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 n.5 (1965); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 501 n.4 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568 (1965); and Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56
(1965).
Another of Professor Amsterdam’s articles, Search, Seizure, and Section
2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1964), has been cited by the Su-
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intelligence and insight into the Court’s thinking was evident
in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) amicus brief he
5
co-authored in Miranda v. Arizona. Although the Court did not
embrace the brief’s argument that providing counsel to all arrestees was the only way to adequately and effectively protect
an arrestee’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
6
self-incrimination in the police station, the brief’s impact was
7
apparent in the resulting opinion in Miranda. As Professor
Yale Kamisar explained,
[t]he failure of the [Miranda] Court to deal explicitly with (if only to
reject) the ACLU contention is surprising, for in all other respects the
ACLU amicus brief presents “a conceptual, legal and structural formulation that is practically identical to the majority opinion—even as
8
to use of language in various passages of the opinion.”

Two years later, Professor Amsterdam co-authored, with
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU, an amicus
9
brief in Terry v. Ohio. That brief urged the Court to adhere to
probable cause as the legal standard for deciding the constitupreme Court on eight occasions: Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 396
n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 829
n.23 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 n.24
(1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.29 (1976); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 n.16 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 305
n.1 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); and Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217, 241 n.8 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
Lastly, Professor Amsterdam’s article, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction To Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965), has been
cited by the Court in three cases: Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 106 n.8
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Georgia v. Rachel, 348 U.S. 780, 786 n.4
(1966); and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 852 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
5. See Brief of the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), 1966 WL 100516.
6. Id. at 3.
7. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Years later, scholars
have advocated for the remedy urged by the ACLU brief. See, e.g., Charles J.
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal To Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1830 (1987) (“I would propose . . . a per se
rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities from interrogating a suspect in
custody who has not consulted with an attorney.”).
8. Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the “New” Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 59, 68, n.47 (1966) (quoting Samuel Dash, Foreword to RICHARD J.
MEDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT
DECISION, at xvii (1966)).
9. Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 113672.
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tionality of police seizures and searches of persons falling short
10
of a custodial arrest and search incident to arrest. If the probable cause test were abandoned, the brief argued that police
stop and frisk techniques would become a tool of police oppres11
sion. Terry, of course, did abandon the probable cause standard and ruled that police may frisk a person if they reasonably
12
suspect the person is armed and dangerous. The brief’s prediction that Court approval of stop and frisk practices would generate hostility within black communities and diminish the
13
Fourth Amendment rights of black citizens was prescient.
10. Id. at 68.
11. Id. at 34 (“[B]oth the ‘balancing’ theory of Fourth Amendment rights
and the Stop-Frisk Model that is built upon it show themselves to be mere fine, scholastic pretexts for oppression. . . . [T]he ‘balance’ scale which they purport to employ is invariably tipped by the police commissioner’s thumb; and
their consequence is nothing more or less than a police dictatorship of the
streets.”).
12. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
13. In 1974, Professor Amsterdam observed: “The pressures upon policemen to use the stop-and-frisk power as a device for exploratory evidence
searches in [urban areas] are intense. Police can justify virtually any exercise
of the power because these are ‘high-crime’ areas where all young males, at
least, are suspect.” Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 438 (footnotes omitted). Almost forty years later, a federal judge found that the New York City Police
Department’s (NYPD) stop and frisk practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of black and Hispanic individuals. See Floyd v. City
of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The federal court in Floyd
also commented on the resentment generated by the NYPD’s stop and frisk
policy. Id. at 556–57 (“The New York City Police Department (‘NYPD’) made
4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012. Over 80% of these 4.4
million stops were of blacks or Hispanics. . . . Those who are routinely subjected to stops are overwhelmingly people of color, and they are justifiably troubled to be singled out when many of them have done nothing to attract the
unwanted attention. Some plaintiffs testified that stops make them feel unwelcome in some parts of the City, and distrustful of the police.”).
Fourteen years prior to the Floyd ruling, the New York Attorney General
issued a report, based on NYPD’s records, regarding the effects of the NYPD’s
stop and frisk practices. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” PRACTICES:
A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 94–95 (1999) (“[B]lacks
comprised 25.6% of the City’s population, yet 50.6% of all persons ‘stopped’
were black. Hispanics comprised 23.7% of the City’s population yet, 33.0% of
all ‘stops’ were of Hispanics. By contrast, whites comprised 43.4% of the City’s
population, but accounted for only 12.9% of all ‘stops.’ Thus, blacks were over
six times more likely to be ‘stopped’ than whites in New York City, while Hispanics were over four times more likely to be ‘stopped’ than whites in New
York City.” (footnotes omitted)). The report later notes that “crime rates do not
fully explain the higher rate at which minorities are ‘stopped’ by the NYPD.”
Id. at 119. Tellingly, the Attorney General’s office found that the NYPD’s utilization of stop and frisk tactics “in minority neighborhoods was identified as a
particular flash point in the matrix of police-community relations.” Id. at 8.
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Though it was published in 1974, the themes analyzed in
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment remain relevant to
many of the Fourth Amendment issues decided by judges to14
day. In a smooth, but elegant style, Professor Amsterdam discussed myriad search and seizure topics, including, why the
Fourth Amendment is essential to a free society; the text and
history of the amendment; whether the Framers’ understanding of the amendment should control or influence modern
search and seizure rulings; the Supreme Court’s mindset when
interpreting the applicability and scope of the amendment; the
problems associated with the so-called “exclusionary rule,”
which suppresses evidence illegally obtained by the police; why
the exclusionary rule is necessary; and why “police discretion to
conduct search and seizure activity [should] be tolerably confined by either legislation or police-made rules and regulations,
15
subject to judicial review for reasonableness.”
I will focus on a few themes raised by Amsterdam that
have resonated with me since I first read his article thirty
years ago. (I have re-read his article several times in my thirty
years as a law professor.) After listing those themes, I will discuss why those themes are relevant to an area of Fourth
Amendment law that affects millions of Americans and has
Others have documented and described the tension produced by stop and
frisk practices. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, The Police Bullies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1997, at A35 (“The stories are endless. If you go into a predominately black or
Latino neighborhood all you have to do is talk to young people at random.
They will tell you how they are stopped, frisked, searched, threatened with arrest if they don’t produce identification, cursed at, slapped around, spreadeagled on the ground, thrown against walls, run off of street-corners, threatened with weapons. Inevitably some are falsely arrested. Some are brutalized.”); see also David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll
on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at B5 (“‘There are [officers] who are
willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his hands in his pockets,’ said an
[NYPD] officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. ‘We frisk 20, maybe
30 people a day. Are they all by the book? Of course not; it’s safer and easier to
just toss people. And if it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun
yet? Things can get a little desperate.’”); Elizabeth Kolbert, The Perils of Safety, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1999, at 50, 51 (describing that the NYPD’s emphasis on getting guns off the streets “put the cops in an ambiguous relationship
with the people they were supposed to be protecting: virtually everyone became a potential suspect”). For a historical account of the NYPD’s stop and
frisk practices from the 1990s to the present, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse
Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City
“Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495 (2014).
14. Amsterdam’s article was the basis of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, delivered at the University of Minnesota Law School on January 22–24,
1974.
15. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 409.
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been the subject of a recent Supreme Court ruling, namely,
traffic stops.
Early in his article, Professor Amsterdam cautions his
readers that he will not be proposing “any single, comprehen16
sive theory of the fourth amendment.” Rather, he intends to
“identify and to discuss a number of basic issues that complicate the development of a single, comprehensive fourth
17
amendment theory.” Similarly, while he devotes considerable
space to discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment, Amsterdam does not rely solely on the Framers’ vision of the
amendment to explain its meaning for today’s world. He explains that there are two ways of understanding the amendment: it could be “viewed as a restriction upon only particular
methods of law enforcement or as a restriction upon law en18
forcement practices generally.” Later, he concludes history
should not control the amendment’s meaning. “[H]istory is a
standoff: there is certainly nothing in it to suggest, let alone require, a narrow or a static view of the fourth amendment’s
19
broad language.” Moreover, Amsterdam recognized that even
if we wanted to “take exclusive counsel of the framers” on the
20
Fourth Amendment’s meaning for our times, advancing technology and science provide law enforcement officials the ability
to search and seize in ways unimaginable to the Framers. Although his example seems quaint in an era when cell phones act
21
like computers and GPS tracking is capable of constantly
22
monitoring an individual’s whereabouts, Amsterdam puts it
nicely when he observes: “Miniscule microphones are not the
23
only wonder of our lives that the framers did not know.”
Because Professor Amsterdam insisted he was not proposing “any single, comprehensive theory of the fourth amend16. Id. at 352.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 361–62.
19. Id. at 401.
20. Id.
21. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (“The term ‘cell
phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”).
22. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam)
(holding that requiring a sex-offender to wear a satellite-based monitoring device at all times constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, reasoning
that the state “program is plainly designed to obtain information. And since it
does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search”).
23. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 401.
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24

ment,” I assume that he might worry if his article prompted
someone to propose a general theory of the Fourth Amendment.
Yet, that is just the impact his article has had on my view of
the Fourth Amendment. Twenty years ago, I wrote that the
“central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police
25
power and discretion.” My view of the amendment was inspired, in part, by several passages in Amsterdam’s article. For
example, he asserts that “[t]he Bill of Rights in general and the
fourth amendment in particular are profoundly anti26
government documents.” Acknowledging that “‘[p]olicing the
27
police’” is an endeavor that “most judges would prefer to
avoid,” and a task that some judges view as none their busi28
ness, Amsterdam nonetheless observes: “[r]ecognition that the
fourth amendment is quintessentially a regulation of the police—that, in enforcing the fourth amendment, courts must police the police—serves to counteract that sense” that judges
29
should defer to police authority. Finally, Amsterdam opines,
echoing Justice Frankfurter, that there are “few constitutional
issues more important than defining the reach of the fourth
amendment—the extent to which it controls the array of activi30
ties of the police.”
Professor Amsterdam also helped introduce to me the importance and relevance of the Fourth Amendment’s history. A
former law clerk for Justice Frankfurter, Amsterdam describes
Frankfurter as one “who more than any other of the Justices
31
sought the fourth amendment’s meaning in its history.” Although he is no proponent of originalism as a theory for deciding
32
constitutional issues, Amsterdam’s article helped me realize
24. Id. at 352.
25. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993).
26. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 353.
27. Id. at 370 (citing Fred E. Inbau, The Social and Ethical Requirements
of Criminal Prosecution, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 209, 212
(1961)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 371.
30. Id. at 377.
31. Id. at 397.
32. See id. at 362 (“[T]he Constitution ‘states or ought to state not rules
for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future . . . .’” (quoting
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83 (1921)));
id. at 416 (“The police in this country are no longer ragged bands of volunteers
bearing flintlocks, and there is no reason to deal with today’s police problems
with a flintlock Constitution.”).
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that studying the history of the amendment—not the type of
historical focus that asks whether the Framers condemned or
approved specific types of governmental searches or seizures,
but a focus on history that seeks to understand the Framers’
general vision of the amendment—is valuable to our understanding of the Fourth Amendment today. Professor Amsterdam is not an academic theorist out of touch with the real
world views of judges and politicians; he recognizes that the
Framers were not solely concerned with protecting the rights of
criminals. But he also understands, paraphrasing Vince Lom33
bardi, “that, while winning isn’t everything, losing is nothing.”
According to Amsterdam, “[t]he revolutionary statesmen were
plainly and deeply concerned with losing liberty. That is what
34
the Bill of Rights is all about.” One quote from Amsterdam illustrates how awareness of the Framers’ experience with arbitrary search and seizure practices can affect how judges interpret the amendment today: “[T]he authors of the Bill of Rights
had known oppressive government. I believe they meant to
erect every safeguard against it. I believe they meant to guarantee to their survivors the right to live as free from every interference of government agents as our condition would per35
mit.”
In the pages that follow, I will connect two perspectives
from Amsterdam’s article—the Fourth Amendment’s concern
with discretionary police power and the Framers’ vision of the
Fourth Amendment to bar arbitrary and ruleless searches and
36
seizures —to an aspect of modern American society that affects
37
millions of people: traffic stops by the police. This past Term,
33. Id. at 400.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 417 (“A paramount purpose of the fourth amendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures. . . . Arbitrary searches and seizures are ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures; ruleless searches and seizures practiced at the varying and unguided
discretion of thousands of individual peace officers are arbitrary searches and
seizures; therefore, ruleless searches and seizures are ‘unreasonable’ searches
and seizures.” (footnote omitted)).
37. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the
End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 874 (2001) (“Every
day, millions of cars are stopped for one of the myriad of [sic] regulations governing our use of public streets. As soon as you get into your car, even before
you turn the ignition key, you have subjected yourself to intense police scrutiny. So dense is the modern web of motor vehicle regulations that every motorist is likely to get caught in it every time he drives to the grocery store. . . . It
is by the good graces, or the inattention, of a police officer that you escape a
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the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v. United States. At issue was whether the Fourth Amendment “tolerates a dog sniff
39
conducted after completion of a traffic stop.” The Court, in a
6–3 ruling, held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed
to handle the matter for which the stop was made” violates the
40
Fourth Amendment. While certainly a temporary victory for
41
Mr. Rodriguez, I submit that Rodriguez is a vexing decision on
several fronts. As I will explain below, Rodriguez is a significant ruling because it rejects the argument that police can prolong a traffic stop to pursue a drug investigation. At the same
time, however, Rodriguez blesses two troublesome investigative
techniques that have been utilized in the country’s seemingly
never-ending “War on Drugs” and that are, in my view, inconsistent with Fourth Amendment freedoms and contrary to Professor Amsterdam’s insights on the amendment.

traffic stop and a ticket, or worse.”).
38. 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
39. Id. at 1612.
40. Id.
41. Although the Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision affirming
Rodriguez’s conviction, the Court remanded the case to the appellate court to
determine “whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation.” Id. at
1616–17. There is no doubt in my mind that the appellate court—urged on by
Justice Thomas’s dissent, see id. at 1622–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that although the appellate court did not address the issue, the officer’s
detection of an air freshener, the passenger’s nervousness, and the officer’s
skepticism about the reasons for Rodriguez’s travels, provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity)—will ultimately find on remand that there was
reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez.
Furthermore, on remand, the prosecution will undoubtedly argue that the
drugs discovered as a result of the illegal seizure are admissible under the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Prior to the Court’s ruling in Rodriguez, the Eighth Circuit routinely upheld extending a traffic stop to permit
a dog sniff, provided the extension of the stop was de minimis. See, e.g., United
States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d. 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A brief delay to employ a dog does not unreasonably prolong the stop . . . and we have repeatedly
upheld dog sniffs that were conducted minutes after the traffic stop concluded.”); see also United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006)
(upholding a four-minute delay as a de minimis intrusion); United States v.
Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002–03 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a two-minute delay);
United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 632 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding a delay
of “well under ten minutes”). On remand, the prosecutor will certainly argue
that under Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (holding the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply to a police search in reasonable reliance on binding
judicial precedent), the evidence unlawfully acquired from Rodriguez’s trunk
is admissible because the police were relying upon binding judicial precedent
that was subsequently overruled.
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Imagine you are driving on an interstate highway or country road ten miles-per-hour faster than the posted speed limit.
Or, you fail to stay in the right lane while driving on an empty
interstate highway, or temporarily veer onto the shoulder of the
road while changing the station on your car radio. Or, unbeknownst to you, your vehicle has a broken taillight. The next
thing you know, the blue lights of a police cruiser appear in
your rear-view mirror. The officer approaches your vehicle and
begins a routine that occurs on countless occasions every day.
After obtaining your driver’s license, vehicle registration,
and proof of insurance, the officer asks you to accompany him
to the patrol car. You comply without asking why you are being
moved from your vehicle. While inside the police cruiser, the officer contacts a police dispatcher or uses his computer to run a
check on your documents. He may also check whether there are
outstanding warrants for your arrest, or request a criminal history report on you. While these checks are proceeding, a remarkable phenomenon occurs. The officer begins asking “itin42
erary” or “context-framing” questions. Where are you coming
from? How long were you there? Where are you going? How
long do you plan on staying at your destination? Who will you
visit? How long have you known that person? Where does she
work? Has she ever been arrested for drug trafficking?
At some point, you realize that what began as an ordinary
traffic stop has morphed into a criminal investigation and you
are the target. Surely, you think, this questioning violates your
rights. After all, you were stopped for speeding, or momentarily
42. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 2012),
(“Once in the patrol car, Trooper Rutledge began to ask Riley questions about
his travel itinerary.”); United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 510 (4th Cir.
2011) (“[The officer] asked Digiovanni numerous questions concerning his
travel history and travel plans, only a few of which possibly related to the justification for the stop.”); United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir.
2010) (stating that asking “context-framing questions will rarely suggest a
lack of diligence” on the part of a detaining officer); United States v. OliveraMendez, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2007) (“When police stop a motorist for a
traffic violation, an officer may detain the occupants of the vehicle while the
officer ‘completes a number of routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks
related to the traffic violation.’ . . . While the officer performs these tasks, he
may ask the occupants routine questions, such as the destination and purpose
of the trip . . . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Travel plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic
stop because the motorist is traveling at the time of the stop. For example, a
motorist’s travel history and travel plans may help explain, or put into context, why the motorist was weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was an urgency to the travel).”).
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veering onto the shoulder, or a broken taillight. While verifying
your driver documents is a valid task aimed at determining if
you are properly licensed and that your vehicle is entitled to be
43
on the road, what is the justification for the questioning?
What do these questions have to do with a broken taillight? The
questioning has absolutely nothing to do with the traffic infraction, which was the only basis for the stop.
It may surprise some, but the Supreme Court, the institu44
tion in charge of “policing the police” and upholding our
Fourth Amendment rights under our constitutional democracy,
without ever directly addressing the issue, has approved this
type of police questioning. Indeed, in its most recent ruling on
the powers of police during routine traffic stops, Rodriguez v.
United States, the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment
tolerates certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen
45
a roadside detention. Rodriguez’s endorsement of police questioning was unnecessary and regrettable. It was gratuitous because the issue before the Court—whether police can detain a
motorist to use a drug-sniffing canine after the completion of a
traffic stop—had nothing to do with unrelated questioning during a traffic stop. The Court’s comments were lamentable for
two reasons. First, the practice of questioning motorists about
matters unrelated to the traffic stop is inconsistent with the
same legal framework the Court relied upon to invalidate the
detention and dog sniff at issue in Rodriguez. Second, there
was no reason for the Court to provide its imprimatur on a
criminal investigative technique that police regularly use to arbitrarily interrogate motorists during routine traffic stops.
On a deeper level, Rodriguez’s dicta about police questioning during traffic stops is disappointing for its failure to appreciate the fundamental value of the Fourth Amendment. As Professor Amsterdam has taught us, “the fourth amendment is
quintessentially a regulation of the police—that, in enforcing
46
the fourth amendment, courts must police the police.” More
specifically, Professor Amsterdam’s article teaches that control43. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658–59 (1979) (“[T]he States have a
vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to
operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence
that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.”).
44. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 370 (quoting Inbau, supra note 27).
45. 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (“An officer, in other words, may conduct
certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.”).
46. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 371.
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ling the discretionary power of officers while they are effectuating searches and seizures is essential to protecting Fourth
47
Amendment freedoms. Police seize millions of Americans eve48
ry year during traffic stops. Traffic stops are rife with the po49
tential for arbitrary and discriminatory police power. “Once
an officer stops a motorist for a traffic offense, the officer has
discretion to transform that traffic stop into an investigation of
other serious crimes without the check of reasonable suspicion
50
or probable cause . . . .” If the Justices want to protect the
Fourth Amendment rights of millions of American motorists,
they should recognize that police interrogation of motorists
about subjects unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop provides police with unchecked discretion to pursue a criminal investigation and is beyond the scope of an ordinary traffic stop.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I explains the result and legal reasoning of Rodriguez. It also explains the legal
standard, first announced in 1968, that courts have traditionally used to judge the constitutionality of police conduct during
investigative detentions, which includes traffic stops. Part II
47. Id. at 415 (“The pervasiveness and discontrol of police discretion is
everywhere acknowledged: policemen make hundreds of thousands of decisions daily that ‘can affect in some way someone’s dignity, or self-respect, or
sense of privacy, or constitutional rights . . . .’” (footnotes omitted)).
48. According to a report issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, in
2011, “[a]bout 10% of the 212.3 million U.S. drivers age 16 or older were
stopped while operating a motor vehicle during their most recent contact with
police.” LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
242937, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 3
(2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf.
49. Cf. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997) (“[State traffic] codes regulate the details of
driving in ways both big and small, obvious and arcane. In the most literal
sense, no driver can avoid violating some traffic law during a short drive, even
with the most careful attention. Fairly read, Whren says that any traffic violation can support a stop, no matter what the real reason for it is; this makes
any citizen fair game for a stop, almost any time, anywhere, virtually at the
whim of police.” (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (ruling
that police motives are constitutionally irrelevant in determining the validity
of a traffic stop))); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and
the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 273 (“Since virtually everyone violates traffic laws at least occasionally, the upshot of [four
rulings decided in the 1997 Term] is that police officers, if they are patient,
can eventually pull over anyone they choose, order the driver and all passengers out of the car, and then ask for permission to search the vehicle without
first making clear the detention is over.”).
50. Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2013).
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discusses recent rulings of the Court that have been read to authorize police to pursue criminal investigative practices—such
as dog sniffs and interrogation unrelated to the reason for the
stop—during ordinary traffic stops, provided those practices do
not prolong the traffic stop. Part II also explains why those rul51
52
ings—Illinois v. Caballes, Muehler v. Mena, and Arizona v.
53
Johnson —have been misread and misapplied to allow arbitrary police interrogation during routine traffic stops.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED
STATES AND TERRY STOPS
The facts in Rodriguez were straightforward. Rodriguez
and a passenger were driving after midnight when their vehicle
veered onto the shoulder of a Nebraska state highway “for one
54
or two seconds and then jerk[ed] back onto the road.” A K-9
police officer, Morgan Struble, stopped the vehicle. Struble obtained Rodriguez’s driving documents and asked Rodriguez to
55
accompany him to the police cruiser. Rodriguez asked if he
was required to do so, Struble said no, so Rodriguez waited in
his vehicle. After checking Rodriguez’s documents, Struble returned to Rodriguez’s vehicle, asked the passenger for his driver’s license, and “began to question him about where the two
56
men were coming from and where they were going.” Struble
then checked the passenger’s record and called for a second of57
ficer. Struble began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez.
After Struble issued a warning and returned to Rodriguez
and his passenger their documents, the tasks associated with
the traffic stop were completed. Rodriguez should have been
free to depart the scene. Struble, however, did not consider Rodriguez free to leave, nor allow him to leave. Instead, he asked
permission to walk his drug-sniffing dog around Rodriguez’s
58
vehicle. When Rodriguez denied permission, Struble ordered
him “to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front
59
of the patrol car to wait for the second officer.” After the se51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

543 U.S. 405 (2005).
544 U.S. 93 (2005).
555 U.S. 323 (2009).
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).
Id. at 1613.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cond officer arrived, Struble retrieved his dog and twice walked
him around Rodriguez’s vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle disclosed methamphetamine. “All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the
time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated
60
the presence of drugs.”
After Rodriguez was charged with possession with intent to
distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, he moved
to suppress the drugs found in his vehicle. The lower federal
61
courts denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded that the seven or eight minute delay between
when the traffic stop should have ended and the dog’s alert to
the presence of drugs was a “de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s personal liberty,” and thus reasonable under the Fourth
62
Amendment.
Like several of the Court’s recent traffic stop cases, Rodriguez presented a narrow issue: “whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traf63
fic stop.” The majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg
held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the
matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s
64
shield against unreasonable seizures.” Reaffirming that a traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to
65
a formal arrest,” Justice Ginsburg explained that “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety
66
concerns.” In what seems intended as a quasi-brightline or per
se rule to assess future cases, Justice Ginsburg wrote: “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic in67
fraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2014).
63. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1614 (citations omitted).
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. Professor Orin Kerr describes this statement as “[t]he most important sentence in the opinion.” Orin Kerr, Police Can’t Delay Traffic Stops
To Investigate Crimes Absent Suspicion, Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST
(Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/04/21/police-cant-delay-traffic-stops-to-investigate-crimes-absent
-suspicion-supreme-court-rules.
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When this standard is applied to the facts in Rodriguez, it
is plain that Officer Struble’s continued seizure of Rodriguez
was unreasonable. Once Officer Struble issued the warning
ticket and returned the motorists’ documents, the “tasks tied to
68
the traffic infraction [were] completed.” The authority for the
traffic stop had elapsed and Rodriguez should have been free to
leave. Instead, Struble prolonged the stop, first by asking
whether Rodriguez would consent to walking the dog around
his vehicle, and then when Rodriguez refused, by ordering Rodriguez out of his vehicle to await the arrival of the second officer. Unless there was some individualized suspicion for this
continued detention, detaining Rodriguez to allow a dog sniff
constituted an unreasonable seizure.
Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument that continuing
the stop to allow a dog sniff for narcotics was reasonable because it was a de minimis amount of time—seven or eight
minutes—and promoted the government’s interest in detecting
69
illegal narcotics. Acknowledging that Pennsylvania v. Mimms
had embraced a similar de minimis rationale when it upheld an
officer’s authority to order a driver out of his vehicle during an
ordinary traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of danger,
Justice Ginsburg explained that the exit order approved in
Mimms promoted officer safety and was tied to completing the
70
mission of the traffic stop. By contrast, detaining a motorist—
even for a minimal amount of time—to allow a dog sniff is done
to detect criminality. Moreover, a dog sniff is not “an ordinary
incident of a traffic stop”; it lacks a “close connection to road71
way safety” in the same way that an exit order promotes officer safety. Thus, a dog sniff for narcotics “is not fairly charac72
terized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.”
Nor was the majority persuaded by the government’s contention that an officer may prolong a stop to perform a dog sniff
provided “the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the
stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other

68. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
69. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
70. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1611 (“The Court reasoned in Mimms that the
government’s ‘legitimate and weighty’ interest in officer safety outweighs the
‘de minimis’ additional intrusion of requiring a driver, lawfully stopped, to exit
a vehicle.”).
71. Id. at 1615.
72. Id.
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traffic stops involving similar circumstances.” In other words,
the government argued that officers who are especially efficient
in completing the tasks related to the traffic stop can earn “bo74
nus time” to conduct unrelated criminal investigations. Justice Ginsburg’s response to this argument was direct and simple: the reasonableness of a seizure “depends on what the police
75
in fact do.” Here, Officer Struble completed the tasks of the
traffic stop when he issued the warning. Because the dog sniff
prolonged the stop beyond that point, it was unreasonable. To
leave no doubt that the rule announced by the majority did not
turn on when an officer chose to sequence a dog sniff, Justice
Ginsburg added: “The critical question, then, is not whether the
dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, as [the
dissent] supposes, but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—
76
i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’”
Rodriguez’s holding that police may not extend—even temporarily—a completed traffic stop to perform a dog sniff for
narcotics is important because it rejects the reasoning of many
lower courts which had allowed police, without individualized
suspicion, to extend traffic stops for criminal investigative purposes.
Rodriguez, however, does not create new law or announce
an innovation in the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine. Rather, Rodriguez’s holding is based on legal norms nearly forty
years old. Indeed, although it may not have been obvious to the
casual reader, the reasoning and result in Rodriguez closely
tracks search and seizure doctrine for investigative detentions
77
that dates back to the late 1960s. In fact, the logic of Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion in Rodriguez parallels the reasoning of her
dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, where a majority of the Court
ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not require reasonable
suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle
78
during a legitimate traffic stop. Dissenting in Caballes, Justice Ginsburg applied the familiar standard of review an79
nounced in Terry v. Ohio to find that a dog sniff had imper73. Id. at 1616 (citing Brief for the United States at 36–39, Rodriguez, 135
S. Ct. 1609 (No. 13-9972), 2014 WL 7205515).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 115–17 (1998)).
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 82–9797.
78. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
79. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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missibly broadened the scope of an ordinary traffic stop into an
80
unlawful drug investigation. But before I explain why Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Caballes was more faithful to
the Court’s precedents than the Caballes majority opinion, I
will describe why Rodriguez’s holding is consistent with forty
years of Fourth Amendment rulings involving investigative detentions.
While the Court considers a routine traffic stop a seizure
subject to Fourth Amendment restraints, it has not treated a
traffic stop as the equivalent of an arrest even when police have
81
probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred.
Because a traffic stop is assumed to be a brief seizure by the police, the Court views a traffic stop as “more analogous to a so82
called ‘Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest.” Terry, which addressed whether police can frisk a person for weapons when an
officer reasonably suspects that the person is armed and dangerous, specified a two-prong standard for assessing the constitutionality of police conduct not amounting to an arrest or full83
scale search of a person. The Court in Terry explained: “in determining whether the seizure and search were ‘unreasonable’
our inquiry is a dual one—[first] whether the officer’s action
was justified at its inception, and [second] whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
84
the interference in the first place.” When this standard is ap80. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Tellingly, the
Caballes majority did not challenge or question Justice Ginsburg’s analysis on
this point.
81. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), however, the
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the custodial arrest of a
person who commits a minor traffic offense.
82. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citation omitted).
While the seizures that occurred in the Court’s initial investigative seizure
cases—Terry, 392 U.S. at 1, and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)—
were brief as a temporal matter, the typical investigative detention is a lot
longer than the seizures upheld in those cases. Indeed, the Court has
acknowledged that the so-called Terry stop “is not confined to the momentary,
on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry
and Adams.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (footnote omitted). Further, although the overwhelming majority of traffic stops are based on
probable cause, as Professor Wayne LaFave tells us, most lower courts have
assumed that traffic stops can also be initiated on reasonable suspicion—a
lower degree of evidence than probable cause. Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine
Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1848 (2004). The Court has not decided
whether this assumption is correct. See id. at 1850–52.
83. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20.
84. Id.
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plied to traffic stops, the first prong considers whether the traffic stop was validly commenced—did the police have probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the motorist? The second
prong—the scope prong—encompasses two factors. As the
Court’s subsequent cases have clarified, the second prong considers both the length of the seizure and the manner or methods
85
used by the police to effectuate the stop.
For example, in 1975, the Court looked to Terry’s framework to decide the constitutionality of investigative detentions
of vehicles near the border for immigration offenses. In United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court stated that when vehicles
are stopped for detentions, under Terry, “the stop and inquiry
must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for
86
their initiation.’” Accordingly, a border agent may question
the driver and his passenger “about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious
circumstances, but any further detention or search must be
87
based on consent or probable cause.”
Brignoni-Ponce was not the only Burger Court decision to
utilize Terry’s two-prong test to judge the validity of investigative detentions. In 1983, in a plurality opinion in Florida v.
Royer, Justice White asserted: “an investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
88
the purpose of the stop.” Furthermore, four of the Justices in
Royer ruled that the prosecution has the burden of establishing
that an investigative seizure was “sufficiently limited in scope
89
and duration.”

85. Cf. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he government’s argument fails to recognize that investigative stops must
be limited both in scope and duration.”); LaFave, supra note 82, at 1863 (explaining that when courts have applied the Terry test to cases involving reasonable suspicion of criminal wronging, rather than in cases involving ordinary traffic stops, “courts have enforced both the temporal and intensity
limits”).
86. 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
87. Id. at 881–82. Ultimately, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce ruled that
stops must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Stopping
a vehicle solely based on the Mexican ancestry of a vehicle’s occupants was
impermissible, but the “Mexican appearance” of an occupant is “a relevant factor” in the reasonable suspicion calculus. Id. at 887.
88. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion).
89. Id. None of the concurring or dissenting Justices in Royer voiced objection to the plurality’s conclusion that the prosecution has the burden of establishing that an investigative seizure be sufficiently limited in scope and duration.
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Two years later, in 1985, United States v. Sharpe clarified
that judges should analyze investigative detentions to determine “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the de90
fendant.” Likewise, in United States v. Hensley the Court instructed that the constitutionality of an investigative detention
is assessed by determining whether the facts “justified the
length and intrusiveness of the stop and detention that actually
91
occurred.”
Even the Rehnquist Court applied the Terry framework to
evaluate the reasonableness of police procedures that begin as
investigative detentions. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District
Court, the Court upheld a statute that authorized police to arrest a person who refuses to identify himself during a valid
92
Terry stop. The Court upheld the law, but only after determining that “the request for identification was ‘reasonably related
93
in scope to the circumstances which justified’ the stop.” Indeed, at the start of its analysis of Terry’s requirements, Hiibel
94
quoted the two-prong Terry test, noted that an officer’s conduct during an investigative detention must satisfy Terry’s
95
scope prong, and ultimately concluded that the challenged
conduct in Hiibel satisfied Terry’s scope prong because the officer’s request for identification was related in scope to the reason for the stop, and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient
96
evidence.” These rulings establish, as Justice Ginsburg noted
in her Caballes dissent, that the second prong of the Terry
test—the scope prong—“is not confined to the duration of the
seizure; it also encompasses the manner in which the seizure is
97
conducted.”
90. 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (citations omitted).
91. 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985).
92. 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
93. Id. at 188–89 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
94. Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 188 (acknowledging the petitioner’s concern that the stop-andidentify law circumvents the probable cause requirement by allowing police to
arrest a person for being suspicious, and explaining that the petitioner’s concerns “are met by the requirement that a Terry stop must be justified at its
inception and ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified’
the initial stop” (citation omitted)).
96. Id. at 189.
97. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 419 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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Judged against this long line of cases, the result in Rodriguez was undoubtedly correct. While the facts in Rodriguez satisfy the first prong of the Terry test because Officer Struble had
probable cause to stop Rodriguez’s vehicle for a traffic offense,
the officer’s conduct violated the second prong of Terry. Once
Struble issued the warning, the purpose for the traffic stop
ended. Further detaining Rodriguez to pursue a dog sniff was
in no way “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
98
which justified the interference in the first place.” No Court
precedent authorizes police to extend—even for a de minimis
period of time—a Terry stop for criminal investigative purposes
after the legitimate purposes of the stop have been satisfied.
Put differently, Rodriguez did not announce new or expanded
99
Fourth Amendment protections. Rather, it simply applied a
standard first announced in 1968, and subsequently applied by
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, to find that detaining a motorist to conduct a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion of criminality was an unreasonable seizure.
II. ARBITRARY POLICE QUESTIONING OF MOTORISTS
DURING ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOPS VIOLATES FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
The legal analysis described above in Part I was enough to
resolve the only issue presented in Rodriguez. Although unnec100
essary to decide Rodriguez, Justice Ginsburg read Caballes
101
and Johnson to allow police to conduct “unrelated investigations” (e.g., dog sniffs and police interrogation) during routine
traffic stops, provided such investigations do not prolong a
98. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
99. The point that Rodriguez does not expand Fourth Amendment protections is not meant to downplay the importance of the ruling or criticize Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion. As noted earlier, Rodriguez’s holding is highly significant
because it shuts down the approach, adopted by a majority of federal and state
courts, of flouting Terry’s temporal restriction. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(b), at
504 (5th ed. 2012) (“[M]ost of the lower courts that have squarely confronted
[challenges based on Terry’s temporal limitation] have concluded, in effect,
that minor violations of the Terry temporal limitation may simply be ignored.”
(footnote omitted)). Indeed, “[t]he fact of the matter is that many federal and
state courts had massaged the temporal limitation so that police were given
additional time to pursue investigations of matters other than the traffic violation. That Rodriguez hopefully closed down that operation is important.” Email from Wayne R. LaFave, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, to
author (July 24, 2015, 12:53 EDT) (on file with author).
100. 543 U.S. at 405.
101. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
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102

roadside detention. During routine traffic stops, dog sniffs
and police questioning are aimed at detecting criminal con103
duct and as Justice Ginsburg conceded, have no nexus to the
traffic stop. The traffic stop, in other words, provides the pretext for a criminal investigation. Justice Alito’s dissent in Rodriguez recognized this; indeed, Justice Alito welcomed the majority’s approval of police interrogation during traffic stops.
After asserting that the Court “reaffirmed” that police may undertake certain unrelated investigative steps during traffic
stops, Justice Alito remarked that “it remains true that police
may ask questions aimed at uncovering other criminal conduct
and may order occupants out of their car during a valid stop,”
without acknowledging the proviso that questioning not add
104
time to the stop.
As I explain below, Justice Ginsburg’s approving comments
regarding Caballes and Johnson take dicta from those cases to
endorse arbitrary police conduct. Caballes and Johnson were
self-described as narrow holdings that did not apply or address
Terry’s scope prong. More importantly, police interrogation
about matters unrelated to the traffic stop violates Terry’s
scope prong. Arguably, police questioning (and dog sniffs) unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop can be performed within
the limits of Rodriguez’s holding; in the future, officers will no
doubt attempt to sequence their “itinerary” questions (and dog
105
sniffs) before the conclusion of the traffic stop. But as Justice
102. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“[I]n
Caballes and Johnson . . . . we concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside detention.”).
103. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death
on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 572–73 (1998) (“Police officers
can use the dogs either to handle searches when there is a refusal, or to short
circuit the whole process by using the dog as soon as the car is stopped, without even seeking consent. Once the dog indicates the presence of narcotics by
characteristic barking or scratching, that information itself constitutes probable cause for a full-scale search. This activity constitutes a picture not of traffic
enforcement but of drug interdiction. That is obviously what all of this is
about; police use traffic infractions as excuses to initiate these encounters, and
the Court’s cases concerning automobiles and their drivers provide the legal
underpinnings for wide-ranging searches . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
104. Rodriguez, 132 S. Ct. at 1625 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting).
105. Justice Alito appears to encourage as much regarding dog sniffs. See
id. at 1625 (“The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going forward. It
is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops.
Most officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot
fathom the reason for that requirement.” (footnote omitted)). Justice Alito’s
subtle advice to officers on how to avoid the impact of Rodriguez during future
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Ginsburg’s dissent in Caballes demonstrated, police deployment of a drug-sniffing canine cannot be reconciled with the
106
Terry test. If using a drug-sniffing dog is inconsistent with
Terry’s scope prong, police interrogation would seem to be a fortiori inconsistent with the scope prong; such conduct is inevitably longer and more personally intrusive than the typical canine sniff. Also, by approving police interrogation unrelated to
the traffic stop, so long as such questioning does not prolong
the stop, Justice Ginsburg has endorsed a rule that lacks
standards and will be difficult for judges to enforce.
Paradoxically, in the same opinion that strikes down an
unconstitutional police investigative technique, the Rodriguez
Court provides a “green light” for another unconstitutional investigative technique. If the Court intended to limit the discretionary power of police during traffic stops, it failed. “[D]rugsniffing dogs are brought around [by police] on occasion, but officers ask questions outside the scope of the traffic [violation]
107
The remainder of this Part explains why
all the time.”
Caballes and Johnson do not support police questioning during

traffic stops is unpersuasive. In his analysis of Rodriguez, Professor LaFave
recognizes that there may be future cases not directly controlled by Rodriguez’s holding. For example:
(i) [T]he officer, needing only three more minutes to complete the
‘mission’ by writing up the warning ticket, instead delays that step
while awaiting backup and putting his dog through his paces, taking
eight minutes, resulting in the discovery of drugs and arrest of the
driver at that point; and (ii) the officer instead uses the eight minutes
at the very outset of the traffic stop, so that the discovery of drugs
and arrest (terminating the traffic stop) occur at that early point.
4 LAFAVE, supra note 9999, § 9.3(b), at 47 (Supp. 2015). However, if Rodriguez’s explanation that the “critical question . . . is not whether the dog sniff
occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting
the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop,’” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at
1616 (citations omitted), then Rodriguez’s holding should cover both hypotheticals. A contrary result would give officers engaged in pretextual traffic stops
“the benefit of a no-lose situation,” and “Rodriguez would stand alone as the
only Supreme Court decision in which the Fourth Amendment status of a police investigative technique can be determined only with the benefit of hindsight.” 4 LAFAVE, supra note 9999, § 9.3(b), at 47–48 (Supp. 2015).
106. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 421 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Injecting [a drug-detection dog] into a routine traffic stop changes the character of the encounter between the police and the motorist. The stop becomes
broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some cases) longer.”). Tellingly,
Justice Ginsburg observed: “The question whether a police officer inquiring
about drugs without reasonable suspicion unconstitutionally broadens a traffic
investigation is not before the Court.” Id. at 421 n.3.
107. Kerr, supra note 67.
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routine traffic stops and why a “no prolongation” standard will
not check the discretionary power of police during traffic stops.
A. ILLINOIS V. CABALLES
Professor Wayne LaFave has described Caballes as a “puz108
zling decision.”
An Illinois State Trooper stopped Roy Caballes’s vehicle for
driving seventy-one miles-per-hour on an interstate road with a
109
sixty-five miles-per-hour limit. Although his assistance was
not requested, a second trooper with a drug-detection dog came
110
to the scene. The second trooper walked the dog around
Caballes’s vehicle while Caballes was sitting in the patrol car of
111
the first trooper awaiting the issuance of a warning ticket.
The dog alerted and a search of the trunk revealed marijua112
na. The Illinois Supreme Court, relying on the two-prong Terry test, found no basis for suspecting that Caballes was transporting drugs and thus ruled that the dog sniff “unjustifiably
enlarge[d] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investi113
gation.”
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion described the issue in
Caballes as “narrow: ‘Whether the Fourth Amendment requires
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drugdetection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic
114
stop.’” The Caballes Court ruled that individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing is not required to justify using a drug-sniffing
canine. The sum and substance of the Court’s reasoning is captured in the following sentence: “In our view, conducting a dog
sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is
lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable

108. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 485–86.
109. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ill. 2003).
110. Id.
111. See id. (stating that while in the patrol car, the trooper asked Caballes
“where he was going and why he was ‘dressed up’”; after confirming that
Caballes’s license was valid, the officer requested a criminal history check,
“then asked [Caballes] for permission to search his vehicle” and “asked
[Caballes] if he had ever been arrested”). From the record it appears that only
after receiving the results of Caballes’s criminal history check did the officer
begin to write a warning ticket. Id.
112. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
113. Id. at 407 (quoting Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205).
114. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(No. 03-923)).
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manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed [Caballes’s] consti115
tutionally protected interest in privacy.”
Although many judges have read Caballes as granting
nearly carte blanche authority to utilize a dog sniff during a
116
traffic stop, the passage from Caballes quoted above is a thin
reed to support that conclusion, and most importantly, it does
not address the holding and reasoning of the Illinois Supreme
Court. As Professor LaFave explains, the decision below “was
grounded in the straightforward proposition that the temporal
and scope limitations adopted in Terry and its progeny are
117
equally applicable to traffic stops.” Moreover, the Caballes
Court’s willingness to “accept the state court’s conclusion that
the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by
the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a
118
stop” utterly fails to address whether employing the dog was
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justi119
fied the [traffic stop] in the first place.” Concededly, that a second officer immediately came to the scene and deployed the
115. Id. at 408.
116. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1619 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Caballes expressly anticipated that a traffic stop
could be reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff.”). Justice
Thomas went on to explain that Caballes drew the “dividing line” between legal and illegal stops based on “whether the overall duration of the stop exceeded ‘the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission,’” and not on
whether the length of the stop exceeded the time needed to complete trafficrelated questioning. Id. (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). The lower courts
have also read Caballes broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 511 F.
App’x 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has stated categorically
that the use of dogs during routine traffic stops does not infringe on one’s constitutionally protected privacy interests.” (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409));
United States v. Walker, 719 F. Supp. 2d 586, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“There is
nothing remarkable about a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a
traffic stop even absent reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains contraband.” (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409)).
117. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 487.
118. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. As one commentator has noted, the basis
and meaning of this statement is unclear “given that none of the state courts
made such a holding explicitly, and the Illinois Supreme Court never so much
as intimated that conclusion.” Harold J. Krent, The Continuity Principle, Administrative Constraint, and the Fourth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
53, 81 (2005). Moreover, Justice Stevens’s opinion never explains why the
trooper’s interrogation of Caballes regarding his attire, running of a criminal
history check, asking for permission to perform a consent search and inquiring
whether Caballes had ever been arrested, “w[ere] entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” Caballes, 543
U.S. at 408; see supra notes 111–155 and accompanying text.
119. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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dog before the first officer finished writing the warning ticket
explains why there may have been no prolongation of the detention. But that determination does not end the constitutional
inquiry. As Justice Ginsburg correctly observed in her Caballes
dissent, “[i]t is hardly dispositive that the dog sniff . . . may not
120
have lengthened the duration of the stop.” As the discussion
above in Part I revealed, Terry and its progeny mandate consideration of both the length and scope of an investigative detention.
The scope prong of the Terry test was violated in Caballes
because using the dog, without individualized suspicion of criminality or consent of the driver, broadened the incident “from a
121
routine traffic stop to a drug investigation.” Why? Deploying
a dog during an ordinary traffic stop “changes the character of
the encounter between the police and the motorist. The stop becomes broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some cases)
122
longer.” The motorist understands that he has been targeted
by the police; it is “an accusatory act” that is likely to be “upsetting to the innocent motorist because it will appear that he has
been singled out as a drug suspect for reasons about which he

120. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 421.
122. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 126–32 (4th Cir.
2010) (describing search in which the detaining officer issued a warning ticket
for excessively tinted windows, then after being refused consent to search the
vehicle, the officer “informed Mason that he believed that there were drugs in
the car and that he was going to have a dog sniff the car”; another officer on
scene performed a dog sniff about five minutes later and the court upheld the
sniff as a de minimis delay supported by reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th Cir. 2008) (ruling a dog sniff violated the
Fourth Amendment because it “extended the scope and duration of the stop
beyond that necessary to issue a citation for a tag-light violation”); United
States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1217–21 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing stop in
which, upon being denied consent to search, the detaining officer “picked up
his police radio to declare that, ‘I have a refusal’—a code phrase indicating to
the other officers that they should bring a drug-sniffing dog to the scene”; then
the dog took “more than fifteen minutes” to arrive and the court invalidated
the sniff as an unreasonable prolongation beyond the scope of a speeding violation); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 944 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]fter
having failed to obtain voluntary consent to search, [the officer] told Mr. Wood
that he was detaining the car and its contents in order to subject it to a canine
sniff.”); United States v. Santillian, No. 13 Cr. 138(RWS), 2013 WL 4017167,
at *4–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (describing a traffic stop lasting one hour and
seventeen minutes that included forty minutes spent waiting for a dog to arrive on the scene; the court ruled the sniff was valid because the motorist
granted officers permission to search the vehicle, and the forty minutes spent
waiting was simply deemed a consequence of granting that permission).
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123

The fact that the dog sniff did not
can only speculate.”
amount to a “search” or additional “seizure” under the Fourth
124
Amendment is legally irrelevant. It was enough that the dog
sniff did not promote the purpose of the traffic stop; “that alone
125
establishes a scope violation.” Put simply, the dog sniff had
no nexus to Caballes’s speeding violation; it was, to paraphrase
126
Rodriguez, solely aimed at discovering criminality.
It is an understatement to say that the reasoning and result in Caballes were disappointing. Professor LaFave, the
greatest scholar on the Fourth Amendment in American history
127
and someone not prone to hyperbolic language, described the
128
Caballes opinion as abrupt and without legal analysis. One
could interpret Caballes as ruling that only activity that
123. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(f), at 546.
124. The fact that neither a dog sniff nor police questioning constitute a
search or seizure does not change the application of Terry’s scope prong. While
one might argue that because neither a dog sniff nor police questioning triggers Fourth Amendment safeguards, a motorist has no constitutionallyprotected interest against this type of police conduct. That position, however,
ignores the constitutional rule that even a lawful intrusion can be unreasonably exacerbated by police conduct that may not be either a search or seizure
and does not prolong a legitimate police seizure, but is nonetheless unrelated
or unnecessary to the accomplishment of the lawful intrusion.
For example, in Wilson v. Layne, while executing an arrest warrant in a
private home, police invited members of the press to accompany them. 526
U.S. 603, 607 (1999). The Court ruled that this action violated the Fourth
Amendment because “the presence of the reporters inside the home was not
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.” Id. at 611. The result in
Wilson did not turn on a finding that the presence of reporters constituted a
separate search or seizure apart from the initial intrusion. Id. at 614. The logic of Wilson shows that the absence of a separate search or seizure does not
mean that arbitrary interrogation of a detained motorist is without constitutional significance.
125. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 489.
126. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (“A dog sniff
. . . is a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also 4 LAFAVE, supra note
99, § 9.3(f), at 545 (“[T]he question is not whether any of the drug-seeking tactics are themselves Fourth Amendment searches, for the point is that they
taint the stop purportedly made only for a traffic violation because they have
absolutely no relationship to traffic law enforcement.”).
127. See Jerold H. Israel & Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave: Search & Seizure Commentator at Work and Play, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 189 (stating
that “it would be fair to say nobody in American history has done more [or better]” writing and analysis of search and seizure doctrine than Professor
LaFave).
128. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 488 (“The abruptness of the
Court’s decision and the virtually total lack of analysis might appear even to
raise some doubt as to what the basis of the decision actually is.”).
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amounts to a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment
triggers Terry’s scope prong. But Justice Stevens never makes
that assertion. Further, it is baffling that Caballes, in reversing
the Illinois Supreme Court ruling “never even cited Terry or
any of [Terry’s progeny] discussing [the temporal and scope]
limitations, and, for that matter, never cited any prior Supreme
129
Court decision at all to justify its holding!”
In light of Justice Stevens’s lack of legal analysis, a judge
might read Caballes as requiring judicial attention only to the
length of a traffic stop. Careful consideration of Caballes, however, demonstrates why that interpretation should be rejected.
Indeed, there are several reasons why Caballes should not be
viewed as announcing a constitutional rule that considers only
the duration of a traffic stop, or as eliminating judicial examination of police conduct unrelated to the purpose of the stop.
Such an interpretation conflicts with Terry, which emphasized
that “[t]he manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether
130
they were warranted at all.” Put simply, it is wrong to read
Caballes as standing for the view that the scope prong of Terry
means duration and nothing more. That view not only requires
ignoring four decades’ worth of cases relying on the two-prong
Terry test, but also requires ignoring the text of Justice Stevens’s opinion. Justice Stevens plainly states that a valid traffic
stop “can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitu131
tion.” This language instructs judges to examine the scope
and intrusiveness of the police conduct. In the very next sentence, Justice Stevens then focuses on temporal concerns. He
asserts that a stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged be132
yond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.”
Thus, when one considers: (1) the fact that Caballes never cites
Terry, let alone hints at overruling the decades-old two-prong
Terry test; (2) other language in Caballes consistent with the
Terry test’s scope prong; (3) the lack of an explanation on why
the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court, which applied the
scope prong consistently with the Court’s prior precedents, is
wrong; and (4) the fact that Justice Stevens characterized the
issue before the Court as “narrow,” it makes no sense to inter129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 487.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).

1966

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1939

pret Caballes as restricting the scope inquiry to duration and
133
nothing else.
If the above analysis is correct, how, then, should one interpret Caballes? The holding in Caballes should be confined to
the narrow proposition that a dog sniff is not a “search” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens devoted much of his opinion to explaining that precedents established that “[police] conduct that does not ‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search subject to the
134
Fourth Amendment.” In his brief, counsel for Caballes sought
to distinguish those precedents from the dog sniff at issue in
135
Caballes. That effort did not persuade a majority of the Jus133. Finally, unless his views had changed by the time he authored
Caballes, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996),
shows that he believes that Terry’s scope prong does apply to police questioning during ordinary traffic stops. In Robinette, Justice Stevens cited Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975), for the constitutional principles that investigative seizures must be
temporary and last no longer than necessary to satisfy the purpose of the stop,
and that an officer’s inquiries during an investigative stop must be reasonably
related in scope to the justification for the stop. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 50 n.8
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Eight years later, in another dissent, Justice Stevens
cited Terry for the rule that “an officer’s inquiry [of someone being detained]
‘must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for [the stop’s] initiation.”’” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 193 (2004) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
134. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 123 (1984)).
135. Counsel argued that United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
should not be read as holding a general principle that dog sniffs are not
searches. Brief for Respondent at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (No. 03-923). He
contended that Place was a “careful contextual” ruling limited to situations
where law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that a person’s luggage
might contain illegal narcotics. Id. Moreover, counsel for Caballes contended
that City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), which in the course of
invalidating a narcotics roadblock acknowledged that a dog sniff was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment, “had no occasion to decide what sort of
Fourth Amendment justification might be necessary for a drug sniff under any
other circumstances.” Brief for Respondent, supra, at 11. And counsel tried to
limit United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (concluding that, relying
on Place, a chemical field test of white powder, which only revealed whether
the powder was contraband or not, was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment), to the specific case where a chemical field test “could reveal
nothing about noncontraband items.” Brief for Respondent, supra, at 12 (citation omitted). In sum, counsel argued that the Court’s prior rulings could not
“fairly be read as having removed dog sniffs from the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment altogether.” Id. at 13. At oral argument, counsel did not get the
chance to argue that use of the dog exceeded the scope prong of Terry. He was,
however, vigorously questioned about the Court’s prior dog sniff rulings, and
was directly asked by Justice O’Connor, the author of Place and Edmond, if he
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Justice Stevens’s majority opinion reaffirmed those
tices.
precedents and concluded that their reasoning was applicable
to the context of routine traffic stops. Therefore, the Court in
Caballes concluded that “[a] dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other
than the location of a substance that no individual has any
137
right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”
This was a reaffirmation of the Court’s first canine-sniffing
138
case, United States v. Place, where the Court described a dog
sniff as a sui generis investigative tactic because, inter alia, it
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contra139
and therefore is immune from constitutional
band item,”
scrutiny. Caballes is best viewed as following the rule announced in Place and nothing more.
B. MUEHLER V. MENA AND ARIZONA V. JOHNSON
Police typically question motorists about topics beyond the
scope of a traffic stop for two reasons: they are seeking consent
to search the vehicle or they are trying to develop reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct, which would justify more intru140
sive detention and investigative methods. Either way, the
was asking the Court to overrule those precedents. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (No. 03-923). He replied that he was not
asking that Place be overruled. Id.
136. Justice Souter’s dissent, by contrast, concluded that “using the dog for
the purposes of determining the presence of marijuana in the car’s trunk was
a search unauthorized as an incident of the speeding stop and unjustified on
any other ground.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
138. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The Court relied upon Place in Edmond, 531 U.S.
at 40, another dog sniff case, and in Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123, a case involving a chemical field test that only revealed whether a substance was cocaine.
139. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
140. See, e.g., GARY WEBB, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE ON GOV’T
OVERSIGHT, OPERATION PIPELINE: CALIFORNIA JOINT LEGISLATIVE TASK
FORCE REPORT (Sept. 29, 1999), https://web.archive.org/web/20060831023209/
http://www.aclunc.org/discrimination/webb-report.html (“[California Highway
Patrol (CHP]) reports make clear that [Operation] Pipeline units exist for one
reason only—narcotics interdiction—and that traffic safety, which is the primary function of the [CHP], is only a minor part of their jobs. . . . Pipeline
teams are able to pull over a great many cars to find drivers who fit established ‘profiles’ of what drug couriers are supposed to look and act like. Once a
profile fits, then the officer’s goal becomes to search the car and the occupants.”); LaFave, supra note 822, at 1885–86 (explaining that police “questioning is sometimes profitable; the interrogatee may actually admit to the possession of drugs, or his staunch denial may produce what is deemed consent to a
search when the officer responds that then the driver will not mind if the of-
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point of the questioning is to investigate crime and has nothing
to do with the traffic stop. When this type of interrogation produces criminal evidence and is later challenged, courts generally concluded, before Rodriguez, that such questioning does not
infringe the Fourth Amendment because it does not unduly
prolong the traffic stop, or it merely constitutes a minor intru141
sion after the traffic stop should have concluded. When judges consider itinerary questioning as a trivial inconvenience,
they have their heads in judicial sand. Consider one description
of such questioning:
The officer is trained to subtly ask [motorists] questions about their
registration papers, their destination, their itinerary, the purpose of
their visit, the names and addresses of whomever they are going to
see, etc. Officers are trained to make this conversation appear [as] a
natural and routine part of the collection of information incident to a
citation or warning. They are advised to interrogate the passengers
separately, so their stories can be compared. The officer will apply
more “indicators” at this point, including how long it took them to answer the questions, how they acted, how consistent their stories were
and what kind of eye contact they made.
....
[In] approximately 30 hours of [actual] videotaped stops . . . [t]he
questioning that was done was intense, very invasive and extremely
protracted. It was not uncommon to see travelers spending 30
minutes or more standing on the side of the road, fielding repeated
questions about their family members, their occupations, their marital status, their immigration status, their criminal histories and their
recreational use of drugs and alcohol. . . .
During the training session[s] . . . officers were advised to take the
motorist’s pulse during the interrogation, to see if the motorist’s heart
[was] beating rapidly. During the videotaped . . . stops, the officer was
repeatedly seen taking motorists’ pulse, pronouncing them “way up
there,” and then demanding to know why the motorist was so nervous. Pulse-taking was also used in conjunction with questions regarding the motorist’s possible use of intoxicating drugs, particularly
methamphetamines, and a high pulse rate was cited on several occa142
sions as the officer’s reasons for requiring a field sobriety test.
ficer looks in the vehicle.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
141. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(d), at 528 (citations omitted).
142. WEBB, supra note 140. Consider also this explanation of a Utah state
trooper’s description of traffic stop questioning:
[T]he officer will ask you a series of questions about your travel plans.
He’ll be friendly and polite: Where are you heading? How long will
you be there? He’ll ask what you do for a living, or something equally
innocuous. [He’ll say:] ‘And when I’m doing this, you know, I’m not
sitting there grilling you,’ . . . . ‘I’m doing it in a way that you probably
don’t even realize what I’m doing.’ What he’s doing is called an interrogation, and your responses are being watched very closely. Did you
have to think before answering? Did you repeat his questions? Are
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When upholding this type of questioning, it comes as no
surprise that “typically no explanation is offered as to why it is
proper to hold someone longer than would otherwise be required because some of the time was taken up questioning the
143
driver about matters totally unrelated to the traffic stop.” I
agree with Professor LaFave that these results “are dead
144
wrong!” They are wrong because such questioning fails the
145
scope prong of the Terry test.
146
After Caballes and prior to the announcement of Mena
the federal courts of appeals were divided over whether police
questioning unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop was con147
stitutional. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the existence of a
split by noting that some federal circuits had ruled that police
could not question motorists about drugs or guns without reasonable suspicion that such items were in the car, while other
circuit courts permitted officers to “subject motorists to some
148
degree of unrelated questioning as a matter of course.” The
Sixth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court resolved this
you being too helpful, too cooperative, or too talkative? Those are all
bad signs, as bad as monosyllabic answers. If you have a passenger,
the passenger will be taken off to the side and interrogated separately. The officer will check to see if your stories match.
Gary Webb, Driving While Black, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 125.
143. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(d), at 528–29.
144. Id. at 529.
145. Id. (“Rather, what should be the correct rule is that followed by some
other courts, is that in strict accordance with Terry and its progeny, questioning during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop and
thus may not be extended to the subject of drugs.”). In a 2004 law review article, Professor LaFave argued that judicial rulings allowing unrelated police
questioning during traffic stops
are totally at odds with the Terry line of Supreme Court decisions on
the limits applicable to temporary detentions, and amount to nothing
more than an encouragement to police to engage in pretextual traffic
stops so that they may engage in interrogation about drugs in a custodial setting (albeit not custodial enough to bring even the protections of Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] into play).
LaFave, supra note 82, at 1887 (footnote omitted).
146. 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
147. See Amy L. Vazquez, “Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead
Bodies in Your Car?” What Questions Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic
Stop?, 76 TUL. L. REV. 211, 223 (2001) (noting the disagreement among the
federal circuit courts at the time: a minority of courts held that police “may
ask any question, and there will not be a Fourth Amendment violation unless
the questioning unreasonably extends the duration of the traffic stop,” while
the majority of federal circuit courts had ruled that police “cannot expand the
scope of questioning beyond any reasonable or articulate suspicion” (footnotes
omitted)).
148. United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010).
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split in Mena and “gave its imprimatur to wide-ranging ques149
tioning during a police detention.”
Since Mena, lower courts have continued to allow unrelated police interrogation, and they now rely upon Mena and
150
151
Johnson for support. After Justice Ginsburg’s comments
approving police interrogation in Rodriguez, future courts will
have little reason to address the constitutionality of police interrogation on topics outside the scope of a traffic stop, provided
the questioning does not “measurably extend the duration of
152
153
the stop” or “add[] time” to the stop. The rest of this Section
explains why Mena and Johnson do not support this result.
Mena is a curious precedent to support police interrogation
about subjects beyond the scope of a traffic stop. First, Mena
did not involve a traffic stop. It was a Section 1983 civil rights
case. Iris Mena claimed, inter alia, that police violated her
Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status while she was being detained inside her home
when the police were executing a search warrant for weapons
154
and evidence of gang membership. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion rejected this claim because the Court’s precedents had established that mere police questioning does not
155
constitute a seizure. The precedents the Chief Justice was referring to involved police-citizen encounters that the Court
156
deemed consensual or potentially consensual. Chief Justice
Rehnquist also relied upon Caballes and explained that because Mena’s detention was not prolonged by the interrogation,

149. Id. The Sixth Circuit conceded that Mena was not a traffic stop case,
but concluded that its reasoning logically applied “and the federal courts of
appeals readily extended its holding to the traffic-stop context.” Id. at 490.
150. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
151. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 530 n.267 (citing cases).
152. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93,
100–01 (2005)).
153. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015).
154. Mena, 544 U.S. at 95–96.
155. Id. at 101 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984)).
156. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437–38 (remanding and directing lower court
to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was
consent, and rejecting the defendant’s argument that there could not have
been consent based on the information provided in the state court decision);
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221 (holding that the encounters at issue were consensual).
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there was no additional seizure, and thus no reason to require
157
independent suspicion for the interrogation.
Although Mena’s brief argued that the questioning violated
158
the two-prong Terry standard, the premise of Mena’s holding—police interrogation does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment—should not be reflexively extended to the very different context of a traffic stop. Why? Because Mena certainly
did not address, let alone hold, that Terry’s scope prong applies
to duration and nothing else. Furthermore, the investigative
detention at issue in Mena was very different from the typical
traffic stop. To be sure, police exercise some discretion when effectuating the type of detention at issue in Mena. However, the
authority granting police access to the premises in a case like
Mena—a judicial warrant—is conferred by a neutral official
who has found probable cause that the home contains evidence
of a crime or persons suspected of criminal conduct. Moreover,
that judicial warrant is designed to focus and narrow the scope
of objects sought by the police. Accordingly, the Court has concluded that the existence of a warrant “provides an objective
159
justification for the detention.” Put differently, a judicial warrant impliedly supports the conclusion that police have reasonable suspicion to connect occupants of the premises to the criminal activity they are investigating.
By contrast, when police question motorists on topics unrelated to a traffic stop, they are on a fishing expedition without
objective evidence of criminal conduct. “One of the truisms of
American life is that the police may, if they want, stop just
160
about any car that is driving down the highway.” Even police
acknowledge their near-absolute authority to seize a motor157. Mena, 544 U.S. at 101.
158. Brief for Respondent at 46–48, Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423). During oral argument, Terry was mentioned only in passing and there was no discussion of Terry’s two-prong test. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–49,
Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423).
159. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981).
160. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 670 (2002); see
also David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 311–12 (1999) (“Since no one can
drive for even a few blocks without committing a minor violation—speeding,
failing to signal or make a complete stop, touching a lane or center line, or
driving with a defective piece of vehicle equipment— . . . police officers can
stop any driver, any time they are willing to follow the car for a short distance.
In other words, police know that they can use the traffic code to their advantage, and they utilize it to stop vehicles for many nontraffic enforcement
purposes.”).
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ist. Not only do police have virtually unlimited power to stop
cars, the initiation of the stop expands their discretionary options. Of course, officers decide whether to issue a ticket, issue
a warning, or simply let the motorist go. But they also decide
many other matters:
On the one hand, police officers are not required to arrest suspects or
to conduct searches when they have probable cause to do so, and frequently they don’t. On the other hand, . . . even in the absence of
probable cause, police officers have complete discretion to take many
162
intrusive nonconsensual actions short of a full-blown “search.”

The point is that police have tremendous discretion during
traffic stops; they possess more discretion than when seizing
occupants of a home while executing a search warrant. For
Fourth Amendment analysis, such discretionary power distinguishes a traffic stop from the investigative detention at issue
in Mena.
In sum, the detention in Mena was incident to a police
power conferred by a neutral judge and did not involve the various discretionary decisions police make when conducting traffic stops. Mechanically extending Mena to traffic stops, as
163
many lower courts have done, ignores a fundamental point
under Fourth Amendment analysis: “In perhaps no setting does
law enforcement possess greater discretion than in the decision
164
to conduct a traffic stop.” Thus, there is good reason for not
extending Mena’s holding to the far different context of arbitrary questioning during a traffic stop. Further, there is no reason to interpret Mena as confining Terry’s scope inquiry to
temporal concerns. The best that can be said for applying
161. Gross & Barnes, supra note 160, at 671 (“As one California Highway
Patrol Officer put it: ‘The vehicle code gives me fifteen hundred reasons to pull
you over.’” (quoting Webb, supra note 1422, at 123)); Harris, supra note 103, at
567–68 (“Witness these statements by police officers, which date back to the
1960s: ‘You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail
him for a while, and then a search can be made.’ ‘You don’t have to follow a
driver for very long before he will move to the other side of the yellow line and
then you can arrest and search him for driving on the wrong side of the highway.’ ‘In the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish
to search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle until
the driver makes a technical violation of a traffic law. Then we have a means
of making a legitimate search.’”).
162. Gross & Barnes, supra note 160, at 675.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he federal courts of appeals readily extended [Mena’s] holding to the traffic-stop context.”).
164. Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for
an Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1107, 1107 (2000).
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Mena’s reasoning to the traffic stop context is that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion relied, in part, upon Caballes, an actual traffic stop case. But given what has been said above about
Caballes, Mena provides weak support for concluding that unrelated police interrogation is permissible during routine traffic
stops, let alone concluding that the scope prong of Terry is satisfied provided such questioning does not prolong the traffic
stop.
The police seizure in Johnson, in contrast to Mena, did
begin as a traffic stop. At the end of a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court stated: “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter
into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those in165
quiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
Johnson addressed the authority of police to frisk a passenger
detained during a traffic stop. Lemon Montrea Johnson was a
backseat passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for an insurance-related traffic offense by several officers of a state gang
166
task force. One officer ordered Johnson out of the vehicle and
began questioning him about matters unrelated to the traffic
167
infraction. Johnson’s behavior and answers lead the officer to
suspect that Johnson might be armed. The officer frisked John168
son and discovered a weapon.
An Arizona appellate court ruled that the interaction between the officer and Johnson, which began as a seizure of
Johnson, evolved into a consensual encounter immediately pri169
or to the frisk. According to the state court, absent reason to
believe Johnson was involved in criminal activity, the officer
lacked authority to frisk Johnson even if she had reason to be170
lieve that he might be armed and dangerous. The Supreme
Court reversed this ruling and explained that Johnson remained detained at the time of the frisk, and a frisk was permissible if the officer suspected that Johnson was armed and
dangerous, even if she did not reasonably suspect that he was

165. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (citing Muehler v. Mena,
544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005)).
166. Id. at 327.
167. Id. at 328.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 329.
170. Id.
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engaged in criminal activity immediately prior to the frisk. At
the end of the opinion Justice Ginsburg wrote that the officer’s
questions about matters unrelated to the traffic stop did not alter the lawful status of the detention “so long as those inquiries
172
d[id] not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
It is plain that Johnson’s language about unrelated questioning is pure dictum. The holding in Johnson dealt with the
authority of police to frisk someone subject to detention due to
a traffic stop when the police suspect the person is armed and
dangerous but lack suspicion to believe he or she has committed a specific crime. Unrelated questioning therefore has nothing to do with the Court’s holding. Justice Ginsburg’s dictum is
a bit surprising in light of the fact that Johnson’s brief only
mentioned the questioning in passing, instead focusing on the
173
lawfulness of the frisk. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg made
no effort to reconcile her dictum with the scope prong of the
Terry test as it has been interpreted by the Court. True, just as
the dog sniff in Caballes did not prolong the traffic stop, the officer’s interrogation did not prolong the seizure of Johnson until
the weapon was found, but Terry requires judges to examine
174
both the length and the manner of a seizure. As Justice Ginsburg recognized in Caballes, “Terry, it merits repetition, instructs that any investigation must be ‘reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
175
the first place.’” Such examination was absent in Johnson.
It is ironic, to say the least, that Justice Ginsburg would
insert this dictum into her opinion in Johnson. After all, it was
Justice Ginsburg who rightly recognized in Caballes that the
Court had not yet answered the “question whether a police officer inquiring about drugs without reasonable suspicion un176
constitutionally broadens a traffic investigation.” That ques171. Id. at 333–34.
172. Id. at 333 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005)).
173. Following the lead of the court below, Johnson’s brief argued that the
encounter between Johnson and the officer was consensual. Brief for Respondent at 35–38, Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (No. 07-1122). The brief also argued that
during a consensual encounter, two conditions are required to authorize a
frisk: an officer may conduct a frisk if he is aware of facts “which lead him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” Id. at 15 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
174. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
175. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 420 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
176. Id. at 421 n.3.
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tion was not resolved in Caballes, as evidenced by the federal
circuit court split described earlier, nor was it addressed in
177
Mena.
Again, it is constitutionally irrelevant that unrelated police
questioning does not amount to a search or separate seizure.
178
Indeed, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court confronted an analogous situation when it addressed the constitutionality of drug roadblocks. At the challenged checkpoint, thir179
ty police officers stopped a predetermined number of vehicles.
An officer approached each vehicle and informed the motorist
that he was being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint. License
and registration were requested and the officer looked for signs
of impairment and conducted an “open-view examination of the
180
vehicle from the outside.” A drug-detection dog was walked
181
around the outside of each vehicle stopped at the checkpoint.
The Court in Edmond acknowledged that the dog sniff was
182
not a search. That finding, however, did not prevent the
Court from holding that the roadblock itself violated the Fourth
183
Amendment. As conceded by the City, the “checkpoint program unquestionably has the primary purpose of interdicting
184
illegal narcotics.” That purpose distinguished the Indianapolis roadblock from previous roadblocks upheld by the Court
whose primary purposes were traffic enforcement or road safe185
ty. Ultimately, the Indianapolis checkpoint was unconstitutional because its “primary purpose was to detect evidence of
186
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Just as the roadblock in Edmond was designed to detect illegal drugs, so too police questioning unrelated to a traffic stop is aimed at detecting ordinary criminal conduct. Thus, it is constitutionally irrelevant in
cases like Caballes and Johnson that a dog sniff or police questioning does not amount to a separate search or seizure. In177. See supra text accompanying notes 146–64.
178. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
179. Id. at 35.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 40.
183. Id. at 48.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding roadblock aimed at detecting drunk driving); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (containing dictum noting the permissibility of roadblocks
that question “all oncoming traffic” for safety and regulatory reasons).
186. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
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stead, “the point is that they taint the stop purportedly made
only for a traffic violation because they have absolutely no rela187
tionship to traffic law enforcement.”
C. ENFORCEABLE STANDARDS
Mindful of the power of officers during traffic stops, Justice
Kennedy once noted that “[t]raffic stops, even for minor viola188
tions, can take upwards of 30 minutes.” Justice Kennedy’s
observation was offered in Maryland v. Wilson to highlight the
“serious” consequences faced by a passenger who is ordered to
189
exit a vehicle during a traffic stop. Justice Kennedy also
190
acknowledged that when Whren v. United States, which ruled
that police motives do not control the lawfulness of a traffic
stop, is combined with Wilson’s holding, “the Court puts tens of
191
millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by police.”
Justice Kennedy’s concerns about arbitrary police conduct
are apropos to the context of unrelated police interrogation during traffic stops. As Justice Kennedy has acknowledged, because traffic stops offer police myriad discretionary options,
neutral principles are required to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of motorists, which means the Justices must provide legal standards that check the discretionary authority of
192
police during routine traffic stops. Interestingly, the Justices
have a clear standard to determine whether police interrogation during a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment. Over
forty years ago, Terry instructed judges to determine whether
the police conduct was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
193
place.” By contrast, the standards employed by the Court today are inadequate, vague and unenforceable.

187. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(f), at 545.
188. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
191. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Cf. id. (“It does no disservice to police officers, however, to insist upon
exercise of reasoned judgment. Adherence to neutral principles is the very
premise of the rule of law the police themselves defend with such courage and
dedication.”).
193. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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For example, in Caballes, the Court stated that a “seizure
that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond
194
the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” In
Johnson, the Court asserted that police inquiries “into matters
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure,
so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the dura195
tion of the stop.” Arbitrary and discriminatory police interrogation during routine traffic stops will not be deterred by
Fourth Amendment rules like the ones offered in Caballes and
196
Johnson.
A “no prolongation” or “do not measurably extend” rule is a
rule without standards. Implicit in such statements is the belief
that the routine traffic stop has a fixed temporal limit, which
police cannot exceed. Not surprisingly, neither the Court nor
any lower court has articulated what that time limit is. In
2000, a Maryland appellate court observed that there is no “set
formula for measuring in the abstract what should be the rea197
sonable duration of a traffic stop.” Fifteen years later, no
court or judge has offered a test for measuring the acceptable
198
length of a routine traffic stop. During the oral argument in
Rodriguez, Justice Breyer suggested the following rule: “It is
the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop or it is
the time that is reasonably required to complete the mission.
199
We can’t do better than that. How can we?” Of course, this
proposal does not help. If police questioning or dog-sniffing is
deemed part of the “mission,” just as doing a license and registration check or requesting a criminal history report are considered part of the mission, then judges have no gauge to de200
termine whether a traffic stop has been unduly prolonged.
194. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (emphasis added).
195. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (emphasis added).
196. Cf. LaFave, supra note 82, at 1867 (“In short, Fourth Amendment limitations upon ‘routine traffic stops’ would be grossly inadequate if expressed
solely in terms of the permissible duration of the stop.” (footnote omitted)).
197. Charity v. State, 753 A.2d 556, 566 (Md. 2000).
198. In a recent article, Professor Katz noted that “[s]ome state courts have
held that processing an ordinary traffic stop should last only about fifteen
minutes, which is probably the short end of that duration; other courts have
indicated that a detention of twenty to twenty-five minutes during a traffic
stop is reasonable.” Katz, supra note 50, at 1458 (footnotes omitted).
199. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1609 (2015) (No. 13-9972).
200. Consider the exchange between Justice Scalia and counsel for Rodri-
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Although the Court has not directly addressed the permissible
duration of a traffic stop, the search for a serviceable and clear
standard has not been advanced by the fact that the Court has
twice rejected arguments to establish fixed time limits for in201
vestigative detentions involving Terry stops. If there is no
discernible timeline beyond which a traffic stop may not extend, how will judges know when police have prolonged (or
measurably extended) a traffic stop by arbitrarily interrogating
motorists about topics unrelated to the stop?
Another problem with a “no prolongation” rule was identified by the former Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court:
This rule is unworkably vague. How is it possible to determine what
amount of time would have been “reasonably necessary” for an officer
to discharge the duties he or she had with respect to the traffic infraction itself? I submit, it is not possible. [A “no prolongation” or “do not
measurably extend” rule] requires the officer and judge to determine
guez during the oral argument of Rodriguez:
JUSTICE SCALIA: [Y]ou apparently embrace the assumption, that
checking on whether you have a . . . proper license, checking whether
the car is stolen, all of these things are embraced within the mission
when the only basis for the stop is you have a broken taillight. How
does that have anything to do with the broken taillight?
MR. O’CONNOR: Those are things, Your Honor, that have been accepted as part of—
JUSTICE SCALIA: I see.
MR. O’CONNOR: —the process.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, then maybe dog sniffing should be too,
right? Dog sniffing is accepted, so long as it’s done before what? Before completion of—
MR. O’CONNOR: Before the completion of the mission.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Which includes not just a broken taillight, but also inquiring into your license, inquiring into prior arrests? That’s all
part of the mission?
MR. O’CONNOR: Yes, Your Honor, it is.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Why don’t you make the dog sniff part of the mission and that will solve the problem?
....
MR. O’CONNOR: You expand the mission, Your Honor, for everything that comes within the tasks that are part of the traffic stop. The
dog sniff—
JUSTICE SCALIA: It’s a broken taillight. That’s the only thing that
comes within the traffic stop. All the rest is added on.
Id. at 8–10.
201. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 n.10 (1983) (questioning the
“wisdom of a rigid time limitation”); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 686 (1985) (acknowledging Place’s unwillingness to adopt a per se time
limit on investigative detentions and favorably quoting Place for the proposition that the Court will not adopt a “hard-and-fast” time limit for a valid Terry
stop).
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the duration of a past event which never occurred, i.e., the length of
time the traffic detention would reasonably have required if the officer had not [subjected the motorist to a dog sniff or arbitrary questioning]. Not only must past history be thus reorganized, but a determination must be made as to how many of the officer’s actions that
never occurred would have been reasonably “necessary” to perform
202
duties that may have been only partly performed.

And when judges attempt to identify other facts that signal
the end of a traffic stop—for example, an officer’s issuance of a
citation and return of a motorist’s driving documents—as a way
to enforce a “no prolongation” rule, “[a] clever officer could always ward off the foreclosing effect of [such a rule] by deliber203
ately delaying his final termination of the traffic stop.” Finally, because some forms of interrogation during traffic stops
202. State v. McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207, 216–17 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted).
203. Charity v. State, 753 A.2d 556, 566 (Md. 2000). The Justices recognize
this issue as well; consider the following exchange between counsel for Rodriguez and some of the Justices:
MR. O’CONNOR: As a policy question, if you could end [the traffic
stop] with the handing of the ticket, that would be acceptable. If we
tie—if we tie the traffic ticket as the end of the—end of the justification for the stop, then we—
JUSTICE ALITO: If we hold that it’s okay to have a dog sniff so long
as it’s before the ticket is issued, then every police officer other than
those who are uninformed or incompetent will delay the handing over
of the ticket until the dog sniff is completed. So what has that—what
does that accomplish?
....
MR. O’CONNOR: What it accomplishes is the—is the enforcement of
the Fourth Amendment. Once the stop is done, once the purpose is
done, the justification is done, the person should be free to go.
....
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, then the police can just say, I’m going to
defer that a few minutes until the dog sniff occurs. It just seems that
you’re not going to accomplish any protection for individuals if that’s
your position, that—that it was just a question of when you do it. So if
you do it during the stop, before the ticket issued, it’s okay and if you
do it two minutes after, it’s not okay.
MR. O’CONNOR: Your Honor, it is—it is okay when the traffic stop is
done. When the mission is complete—
JUSTICE SCALIA: You can’t possibly mean that. You can’t possibly
mean that.
MR. O’CONNOR: Oh, yes, sir, I do.
JUSTICE SCALIA: The stopping officer says, I’m done, I got my ticket here. It’s all written out. However, before I give it to you, I want to
have a dog sniff, I’m going to call in to headquarters. They’re going to
send out a dog. It’s going to take maybe 45 minutes. You just sit there
because the traffic stop is not—is not terminated until I give you your
ticket. You’re going to allow that?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–13, Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (No. 139972).
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entail a de minimis amount of time, and the opportunities to
delay or extend the tasks associated with the traffic stop are
ample, a “no prolongation” rule provides police unchecked discretion to question motorists about almost any topic whether
204
related to the scope of the traffic stop or not.
When judges interpret Caballes, Mena, and Johnson as
holding that “scope” means duration and nothing else, it is understandable why they have been unable to articulate a clear
and workable rule. If the scope prong is confined to examining
only the length of a stop, then no such rule exists. During the
oral argument in Rodriguez, Justice Sotomayor pushed for
what she considered to be a “simple rule”—“[I]f you’re going to
do a stop, you can’t reasonably extend or pass the time it takes
205
to deal with a ticket, correct?” I do not believe that this “simple” rule will work either, so long as police are permitted to do
all the discretionary tasks that courts currently allow, such as
checking on outstanding warrants, requesting criminal history
reports, seeking consent to search a motorist’s vehicle, and
questioning motorists about topics unrelated to the traffic
206
stop. Concededly, the temporal restriction of the second prong
of the Terry test does not exhibit bright-line qualities; that’s because “the permissible length of time can only be ascertained
upon assessing the facts and circumstances of the particular
207
case.” However, if judges desire clarity and guidance in this

204. See Salmeron v. State, 632 S.E.2d 645, 648 (Ga. 2006) (Sears, C.J.,
dissenting).
205. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2033, at 20. The Rodriguez
majority seems to adopt Justice Sotomayor’s “simple rule” when it states: “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—
or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
206. Although again unnecessary to its holding, the Rodriguez Court gave
its imprimatur to criminal history and outstanding warrant checks when it
noted that traffic stops are “‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’
so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in
order to complete his mission safely.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. The Court
then cited to dicta from United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (10th
Cir. 2001) (recognizing police safety reasons for criminal history and outstanding warrant checks). Tellingly, in Holt the Tenth Circuit held that the government’s compelling interest in police and bystander safety justified asking a
motorist about the presence of weapons in his vehicle after being stopped for a
seatbelt violation. Id. at 1226; see also LaFave, supra note 82, at 1876–78 (noting that lower courts have approved the general practice of conducting warrant checks during routine traffic stops); id. at 1880–81 (stating that most
courts have found that a criminal history check is a valid part of a traffic stop,
even for an innocuous traffic offense such as an unsignaled lane change).
207. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 506 (footnote omitted).
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area, they will not find it in a “no prolongation” or “do not
208
measurably extend the duration of the stop” standard.
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg’s refinement of these
rules in Rodriguez fares no better than the original “no prolongation” rule. Responding to the dissent’s claim that in future
cases police will conduct dog sniffs before concluding a stop,
Justice Ginsburg stated: “The critical question . . . is not
whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a
ticket, as Justice Alito supposes, but whether conducting the
209
sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’” In the typical
case where a motorist remains inside his vehicle, of course, police questioning about matters unrelated to the traffic stop (or
conducting a dog sniff) will “add time” to the stop. How can an
officer question a motorist about unrelated topics without adding time to the stop? And if the officer wants to question a passenger to look for inconsistencies with what the driver has already said, such questioning will “add time” to the stop. Justice
Ginsburg points to Caballes and Johnson for support because
the dog-sniff and questioning in those cases “did not lengthen”
210
the stops. But the facts in Caballes and Johnson were atypical for a routine traffic stop. In Caballes, a second officer, who
immediately came to the scene after hearing about the stop on
his police-radio, performed the sniff procedure while Caballes
sat in the stopping-officer’s patrol car awaiting the issuance of
211
a warning ticket. In Johnson, three officers from an anti-gang
unit stopped a vehicle with three occupants. Each officer dealt
separately with an occupant, which allowed the officer questioning Johnson to conduct her interrogation while her col212
leagues questioned the remaining two occupants.
To be sure, if an officer interrogates a single motorist inside a patrol car while checking the motorist’s documents, or
awaiting a criminal history or outstanding warrant check, brief
questioning may not prolong the stop. But the cases indicate

208. Cf. id. § 9.3(f), at 544 (“There should be no need for the complex and
often nearly impossible task of calculating just when the time should be
deemed to have expired in the case of a particular traffic stop and, often, the
equally bedeviling task of heading down the slippery slope to determine just
how much extra time after the proper ending of the traffic stop should be excused on some de minimis theory.”).
209. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (citations omitted).
210. Id. at 1614.
211. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
212. See Johnson v. United States, 555 U.S. 323, 327–28 (2009).
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213

that police interrogation is seldom brief. In fact, there is objective evidence to suggest that police interrogation, particularly when performed by drug-interdiction officers who use traffic
offenses as a pretext to conduct criminal investigations, is “in214
tense, very invasive and extremely protracted.” The most
practical and clearest rule is the standard that was established
in Terry: whether the police conduct was “reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
215
the first place.” When this rule is applied to police interroga213. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758, 761–62 (8th Cir. 2012)
(describing a stop in which fifty-four minutes passed between the stop’s initiation and a dog sniff, and during which time the officer asked all sorts of questions unrelated to “crossing the center line,” for example: where the driver was
coming from, how long he had been there, what he thought of the hotel portion
of the Hard Rock Casino, what floor of the hotel he had stayed on, and if he’d
ever been in trouble before); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1514
(10th Cir. 1998) (describing how the defendant and his wife were stopped because an officer suspected the defendant was not wearing a seat belt; after determining that defendant was properly driving the vehicle, officer interrogated
defendant about his destination, whether his wife was employed, when the
couple were married, and whether they were carrying any large sums of money); Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (describing a case when a motorist was stopped for driving five miles per hour over the
speed limit, after which the officer asked the motorist: “Do you have any drugs
in the car? When was the last time you used marijuana? Have you ever been
arrested for drugs? Has anyone been in your car recently with drugs? Do you
object to a search of your car? Do you have any objection to the drug dog walking around your car? . . . Do you have any guns in your car? Have you had any
firearms violations?” (footnotes omitted)). If the detained vehicle contains passengers, the passengers often are separated for individual questioning, after
which officers compare their answers, prolonging the traffic stop further. See,
e.g., United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 852–54 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining
that when the officer detained a car containing three brothers, the driver was
immediately taken into the squad car for questioning, then another brother
was taken off to the side of the road to a ditch for questioning, leaving the
third brother in the car alone for questioning).
214. WEBB, supra note 140. The report continues:
Key to the program is the use of “verbal warnings” to pull over suspicious-looking motorists in order to question and, if need be, search
them. Verbal warnings are regarded by drug interdiction troopers as
a tool of [the] trade, and by their superiors as a measure of the trooper’s productivity and aggressiveness in the search[] for drugs. Since
Pipeline officers are not expected to write many traffic tickets, and occasionally are discouraged from doing so, there can be no legitimate
reason why they would stop and detain thousands of motorists simply
to warn them against insignificant vehicle code infractions. There can
be little doubt that verbal warnings have been used by CHP drug interdiction teams as pretexts to investigate motorists for drug crimes.
As a result, many motorists have been subjected to intense, invasive,
and extremely protracted roadside interrogations.
Id.
215. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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tion unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop, the answer is
clear—such questioning violates the Fourth Amendment because it has nothing to do with a routine traffic stop.
CONCLUSION
216

In 1984, Berkemer v. McCarty addressed whether roadside questioning of a motorist during a traffic stop requires the
giving of Miranda warnings. The defense argued, inter alia,
that unless warnings are provided, police “will simply delay
formally arresting detained motorists, and will subject them to
sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their
217
initial detention.” Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Marshall commented that the Court was “confident that the
218
state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass.”
Well, thirty years later one can conclude that the Court was
wrong; police routinely subject some motorists to persistent and
intimidating interrogation unrelated to the purpose of a traffic
stop. Although the questioning in McCarty was related to the
reason for the stop, the law reports are full of cases demonstrating that questioning about a motorist’s itinerary, drugs, or
guns is arbitrary and done in the absence of individualized
suspicion of criminality.
Regrettably, the Court has never directly addressed
whether police questioning unrelated to the purpose of a traffic
stop is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s neglect to confront this issue is unfortunate because the bulk of
arbitrary police interrogation is borne by innocent motorists
who will often allow police to search their vehicles due to fear
219
or ignorance of their constitutional rights. It is sometimes
216. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
217. Id. at 440.
218. Id.
219. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 160, at 667, 672 (explaining that the
results of an empirical study of highway stops by the Maryland State Police
from January 1995 through June 2000 show that “[t]wo-thirds of the cars
searched by the Maryland State Police carried no illegal drugs, or at least
none were found,” and that “when consent was requested [by the Maryland
State Police] consent was given, 96% of the time statewide and 97% of the time
on [the northern portion of Interstate 95 from Baltimore to the Delaware border]”); see also, WEBB, supra note 140 (“While [Operation Pipeline] sometimes
results in large drug or cash seizures, it also consumes hundreds of man-hours
in fruitless and intimidating searches of motorists who, for the most part, are
Latino and are guilty of nothing more than a minor traffic infraction, if that.
The program also falls heavily upon tourists and vacationers. CHP routinely
exploits differences in state motor vehicle laws regarding window tinting and
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said that “the Fourth Amendment has become constitutional
law for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal (through
the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citi220
zen remotely if at all.” If the Court wants to counter that perception, it should abandon the dictum offered in Rodriguez and
announce that arbitrary police interrogation during routine
traffic stops is inconsistent with the central meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, which, as Professor Amsterdam’s article
brilliantly teaches, was designed to restrain police discretion
when conducting searches and seizures.

license plates to stop out-of-state vehicles and interrogate the passengers.”).
The California report specifically analyzed one trooper’s reports over the first
nine months of 1998, which showed 1,264 verbal warnings issued, 163 searches, and only 18 finds, meaning “about 1% of all the stops he made” resulted in
the discovery of contraband. Id. A report from the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office on traffic stops and consent searches conducted by New Jersey
State Troopers on a section of the New Jersey Turnpike made similar findings.
See STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM, N.J. ATTORNEY GEN., INTERIM REPORT REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 36–37 (1999), http://www.state
.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf (finding that in New Jersey, “most of the consent
searches that we considered did not result in a positive finding, meaning that
they failed to reveal evidence of a crime . . . major seizures of significant drug
shipments are correspondingly rare”).
220. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

